This paper uses search theory to examine the role that risk preference (RP) plays in farmland preservation. Assuming that the distribution of the offer price is fixed, the analysis indicates that risk-averse agents have lower reservation prices than risk-neutral agents, and that agricultural land held by the former exits farming at a faster rate. The results alsb show that farmland preservation policies which increase reservation prices have a greater capitalization effect if agents are risk-loving, and that such policies, while effectively protecting the interest of land speculators, may be less effective in serving the needs of farming and farm-held open space.
Farmland preservation policies can be found in all argued that in some cases the benefits of the polfifty states, yet the role that the risk preferences of icies are capitalized into farmland prices: Thus, farmers and other agents play in preserving farm-these prices become higher than they would be land has received very little attention in the litera-without government intervention. This increase ture. Understanding that role is essential to evalu-can be considered the capitalization effect of the ating the effectiveness of such policies and may policy (see Fischel for a review of the capitalizaprovide a basis for informed land-use decisions by tion effects of zoning). policy makers. These decisions are generally mo-
The magnitude of the two effects and the implitivated by the need to provide open space (Rose) , cation they hold for farmland preservation policy is environmental amenities (Kline and Wichelns), not clear when risk preferences are considered. and public goods (Nelson), and considerations re-Past research on uncertainty and land prices progarding the production of specialty crops (Berry; vides little guidance because the focus as tended to Sinclair). The motivations are supported in part by be on the importance of these elements in land the belief that the free market will not socially price formation. White and Zimmer illustrate the optimize the allocation of land between open space importance of risk as a determinant of farm real and environmental amenities and other uses, such estate prices. Harris and Nehring develop a theoas maintaining sufficient land for a viable agricul-retical model in which they demonstrate the relature (Gardner). Hence some type of government tive importance of the degree of risk aversion in action is generally proposed to preserve farmland. determining bid-price differentials among farm
The instruments of farmland preservation gen-size classes. Brown and Brown examine the effect erally used by government range from property tax of heterogeneous expectations on farmland prices relief policies to agricultural zoning and the acqui-and conclude that the speculative component built sition of development rights (see Forkenbrock and into a seller's reservation price is partly responsiFisher; Berry and Plaut; Furuseth; and Nelson ble for the rise in farmland prices. 1986 for further discussion of the effectiveness of Though the previous studies identify the effecthese policies in preserving farmland). In all cases, tiveness of certain policy instruments in preserving the policy instrument has a preservation effect by farmland and the importance of risk and uncerkeeping land in agriculture longer. It has also been tainty in land price formation, the existing literature provides no theoretical framework that integrates farmland preservation and risk preferences. This study attempts to construct a theoretical ap- farmland preservation policies when risk prefer-ences are considered. The approach is more than a edge, however, search theory has not been applied novel method for examining farmland preservation to the farmland market where sellers engage in a when risk preference is present. The results show sequential search process. Following Sargent, we that risk preference affects current farmland pric-develop a simple supply-side model to illustrate ing decisions and holds important implications for the formation of the seller's reservation price (or future farmland preservation policy. For example, reservation wage in the case of job search theory), in the case of farmers who are more risk-averse which we later use to analyze the impact of risk than are other agents, the results of our search preference on farmland preservation. model suggest that comparatively more land will Suppose a farmer owns a parcel of land L, where end up in the hands of other agents. Under the L = 1, the normalized unit of land. The farmer same ordering of preferences, the results, which obtains income, I, from the land at time t. Hence are consistent with empirical observations in land a risk neutral farmer will maximize the present market studies, also show that farmers appear to discounted expected income, benefit less than other agents from government policies that increase current farm income, making the land they hold more vulnerable to conversion (1) v ( a farmer who has offer price q in hand. E is the expectation operator, and (3 = 1/(1 + r) is the The basic model has already been developed by discount factor with discount rate r. Suppose fur- Tavernier and Li (1995) . It is useful to present the ther that the farmer has the potential to sell the land framework again, however, to focus on the under-and gets an offer price, q, from the buyer. This lying relationships that are relevant to this study. means that she can obtain income I t from one of The approach uses search theory, which has been two sources, farming or the sale of land. If she shown to be useful in analyzing the market for sells the land at time t, she gets price, q, a one-time heterogeneous goods (see Lippman and McCall; income, and stops the search process (e.g., I, = q Kiyotaki and Wright).
at time t and 0 thereafter). If she keeps farming, According to "job search theory," an unem-she receives farm income, z, for this period (i.e., I t ployed individual looks for a job offer each period, at time t) and searches for another offer in the next where the job offer consists of a stated wage rate. period t + 1. The variable z is assumed to be The individual knows the distribution of wage exogenous even though in reality it might be afrates, and each offer is an independent draw from fected by government agricultural policies and lothat distribution. The idea here is that the individ-cal property tax policies, among others. The deciual may know the general features of the wage sion problem to sell or not to sell can be thought of distribution in a location but does not know which as weighing the opportunity costs associated with firm or unit of the firm offers which wage (Devine keeping the land in its current farming use as opand Kiefer). For landowners, the assumption is posed to the expected gain from selling for develthat an offer to purchase land is made by buyers in opment. If the farmer decides to search for a new the land market. The number or type of buyers in offer price p, then she implicitly believes that the the land market or how much buyers would be present value of the land sold at a future date is willing to pay for the land is not known. Hence the more than the present value of the land sold today. distribution of the offer price for the land market in Define the future offer price of land as a nongeneral is not known, although specific features of negative random variable, p, with a cumulative the offer distribution, such as soil type, infrastruc-probability price distribution F(P), by F(P) = ture, range of previous offers, and so on may be Prob{p < P}. We assume F(0) = 0 and F(oo) = 1, known for a particular location. Common to both where F is a nondecreasing function and continuthe land seller and the job seeker are a degree of ous function from the right. We assume further uncertainty characterized by imperfect information that F is bounded from above (i.e., there is an in both markets and a commitment of time and upper bound B < o, such that F(B) = 1). The resources devoted to the search process.
farmer does not observe all p, but the distribution The application of search theory to analyze an F(P) from which the future offer price p at time t unemployed worker's optimal search strategy in a is randomly drawn. The farmer knows the distrinonsequential framework has already been exam-bution of the offer price for land in an area or ined (Stigler; McCall) . To the best of our knowl-region but does not know the specific price for any tract of land. So the relevant distribution may be The solution to equation (5) is unique. 2 The leftspecific to tract characteristics, such as amenity hand side of the equation can be considered as the benefits and developmental potential, which is marginal cost of searching one more period when captured in F and might itself be the result of a an offer q is made. The right-hand side represents search effort. For now, we assume that the distri-the expected benefit from searching, in terms of bution, F(P), for a particular parcel of land is the expected present value associated with drawing given.' p > r. Equation (5) enables the farmer to set the The sequential nature of the search process reservation price such that the cost of searching in makes dynamic programming a convenient method one more period equals the marginal benefit from to model the decision-making process. Without re-waiting and could be considered the optimal decicall, Bellman's functional equation can be ex-sion rule of farmers in the farmland market. Equapressed as tion (5) is also an implicit function of the reservation price.
To facilitate the analysis, let where the maximization is over the two actions, (6) h(r) = fr F(p)dp. (1) accept the offer q this period, or (2) reject the offer q and receive z this period and draw a new Then equation (5) becomes offer price p from distribution of F(P) next period. The value function v(q) is of the following form, (7) r -z = PEp + fh(r).
Farmland Market and Preservation Policy where r is the reservation price or the minimum offer that the farmer would accept for the land. In this section the search model is used to provide Equation (3) says that if the offer price q is greater insights into the underlying relationships between than or equal to the reservation price r, the farmer the farmland market and preservation policy. will accept the offer q; otherwise she receives z and
Recall that the mix of olicies enerall used to continues to search another offer. Here it is as-preserve farmland includes property tax relief, preserve farmland includes property tax relief, sumed that the probability of getting an offer next right-to-farm laws, acquisition of development period is one (see Sargent for the search model in rights, and agricultural zoning. Of these policies which this probability is not one). This equation property tax relief is perhaps the most controver can be converted into an ordinary equation that sial for some argue that it encourages speculation enables us to solve for the optimal reservation over preservation (Nelson 1990) . The policy reprice. At this price there is no difference between duces the taxes farmers pay because their land is accepting the offer, q, and searching for a p in the assessed at its agricultural use instead of its market next penriod.
.value or development potential. This practice inMore formally, evaluating v(r) and using equa-directly increases farm income and has implication (3), we have tions for the farmland market and farmland pres-
(4) r = Z + 3 vp)dTo see this we apply the implicit function theorem to equation (7) and get
r-z = Ep + 3 f F(p)dp.
According to equation (8), increases in farm in-P -z = 3E+ Jo F(p)dp. Jcome lead to increases in the reservation price. This increase in the reservation price is in part related to the effect of the property tax relief polIn another paper, Tavemier and Li (1994) examine the formation of icy, which increases farm income, leading to a F(P) in a game theoretic framework.
2 For proof that the above problem satisfies Blackwell's sufficient capitalization of the policy in land values. This condition for a contract mapping, see Sargent. finding is supported by Anderson and Bunch.
The variable z may also be seen as an opportu-suggests that any increase in r increases T and nity cost of farming (not selling) if it is negative. delays the sale of farmland and that for a given F, Increases in the opportunity cost or decreases in the mean waiting period before land is sold, is a farm income decrease the reservation price. This monotonically increasing function of the reservadecrease may not necessarily result in the imme-tion price, r. This value can be used as a measure diate conversion of farmland, because the reserva-of the impact of public policies on farmland prestion price is also a function of the subjective belief ervation. Notice, however, that increases in z also about the distribution of the future offer price; but, increase T. according to our model, a reservation price lower Using equations (8) and (9), we have than the offer price increases the chances thatr) dr farmland will be sold at the current offer price, and (10) d -fr))2 > 0, conversely a reservation price higher than the offer dz dr dz ( -F(r dz price decreases the chances that farmland will be where r) is the probability density function of sold. In our model, it is assumed that farmers and F(r). It is clear from equation (10) that any policy other agents have the same wealth and the same that increases directly (e.g., direct production subjective distribution of offer prices. Further note s idies) or indirectly (property tax-relief) also that the reservation price itself is a function of the su ies) or nd hs a preserty taelief ) ao subjective belief about the distribution of the offer ncreases T and has a preservation effect and should be considered in farmland conversion
The above results are consistent with cases and should be considered in farmland conversion where farmers operate their farms at a loss (z < 0) issues. The case in which farmers and other agents within the relevant range instead of selling below have different subjective distributions of the offer the reservation price The preservation effect price can be analyzed by the inclusion of the theory frm frmig till r i posive T> 0. Howof asymmetric information in our framework (Ak-from farming still remains positive T > O How of asymmetric information in our framework (Ak-ever, the magnitude of the final preservation effect erlof). However, we are solely interested in the is not uite clear because of the influence of F(r) in difference between the risk preferences of farmers.
Ts teorecal inng m e and other agents for a given level of risk.
equation (10). This theoretical finding may help and other agents for a given level of risk.
^ ^ ^ai analyses of the effectiveThe decision to accept or not to accept the cur-explain why empirical analyses of the effective rent offer price is based on the farmer's reservation ness of property tax relief policies in preserving price and influences the length of time land re-famld b e ue t t ission of a variable or vaimains in farming. Following our definition of could be due to the omission of a variable or varimains in farming. Following our definition of ables measuring the impact of government inter-F( · ), let F(r) be the probability of offer prices ve ntion on the demand side of the farmland marlower than reservation prices, i.e., F(r) = Prob{q r r}. The search model suggests that the farmer ket. rejects such offer prices with probability F(r) and The results derived above are based on the assrejects forsuch offter p ces w ith probility F(r) and sumption that the distribution of offer prices does searches for another offer price in the next period.
not change in response to government intervention not change in response to government intervention Thus, the probability that the farmer accepts an in the farmland market. This assumption is qsoffer in period n is (1-F(r))(F(r))n-, which fol-ton , if far ar e rational agents, we tionable, for if farmers are rational agents, we lows a geometric distribution from which the pres-would expect them to incorporate all relevant inervation effect formation affecting land transactions into their de-1 cision making processes. Hence, considering that (9) T 1 -F(r property tax relief policies increase reservation prices, farmers may be inclined to set higher rescan be calculated. The variable T equals the ervation prices, which would increase the capitalamount of time that land remains in farming before ization effect of property tax relief policies. it is sold and is the reciprocal of the probability of accepting the offer on a single trial. Equation (9) Uncertainty and Risk Aversion 3 Note that the probability that a seller will find a buyer for his land
In the previous section we showed that farmland in a given period is the probability of receiving an acceptable offer. This preservation policy and, in particular, property tax probability equals the product of (a) the offer probability, and (b) the probability that a random offer drawn from the distribution of the offer relief policies had two possible effects on agriculprice will be above the seller's reservation price. In the simple frametural land. First, we showed that the policy inwork used here, these factors are constant, so that the probability of selling land is itself constant. Hence the probability that land will remain in farming for one period, two periods, etc., can be calculated from the geometric distribution. See Devine and Kiefer for the argument from the 4 Such behavior can be considered rational if farmers anticipate higher point of view of an unemployed worker, future offers.
duced an increase in the reservation price, which that increases in the reservation price could be the we called a capitalization effect. Second, we dem-result of increased volatility in the buyer's market onstrated that increases in the reservation price de-or an increase in the mean of the offer price, an lay the sale of land and lead to a preservation ef-observation consistent with the findings of Titman fect. We now examine the effect of uncertainty and and of Ellson and Roberts. The implication for risk on the capitalization and preservation of farm-farmland preservation and the capitalization of land. farmland has already been noted. It is a commonly held position that individuals
We have up to this point shown how uncertainty are not indifferent to uncertainty and will not, in affects the reservation price of land owners. Earlier general, value assets with uncertain returns at their we illustrated the capitalization effects and the deexpected values (see Arrow and Lind for a greater lay in the sale of land when farm income was inexposition of this argument). In what follows, un-creased. These insights were based on the assumpcertainty is modeled as the distribution of the offer tion that farmers were risk-neutral. Though this price, because farmers do not observe the true of-assumption simplifies the model, it does not exfer price. For simplicity we continue with the risk plain the risk-averse behavior of many agents in neutrality assumption before demonstrating the im-the economic world, a serious omission of farmpact of different risk attitudes on farmland preser-land preservation studies (Brown and Brown) . We vation.
now examine the implication for farmland preserRecent theoretical studies show that land-use vation policy when risk aversion is incorporated control programs may cause an increase in the de-into the analysis. mand for land because they reduce uncertainty Assume that farmers behave as expected utility (Titman; Shilling, Sirmans and Guidry). Beaton maximizers following the axioms of rationality esand Henneberry and Barrows have also established tablished by von Neumann and Morgenstern. Furthat government land preservation policies affect ther, assume that their expected utility function, u, the degree of uncertainty in the farmland market. is C 2 . Then equation (5) becomes Hence, past studies suggest that uncertainty plays a role in land price formation, and risk preference (11) r affects land allocation decisions. Therefore, the
capitalization and preservation effects of farmland preservation implied by the search model suggest To examine how the farmer's attitude toward that land price formation under different risk pref-risk affects the reservation price and the subseerences would affect land conversion and subse-quent implication of risk preferences for farmland quent preservation efforts differently. preservation, we develop the following proposiWe have already established that if farmers do tion.5 not sell their land in the current period, then they PROPOSITION 2: A risk-averse (loving) farmer wait to draw another p from the distribution of has a lower (higher) reservation price than a risk-F(P) in the next period, having observed only the neutralfarmer. distribution of the offer price and not the true offer PROOF: Suppose the farmer is risk-averse; then u price. Rothschild and Stiglitz show that an increase is a concave function. Because u is C 2 , -1( ) will in h(r) (in equation [7] ) without a corresponding be a convex function. Using the definition of conincrease in Ep results in a mean-preserving in-vexity and concavity and the Jensen inequality, we crease in spread. To understand the implication for have the reservation price, we formulate the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: An increase in the mean of the r a = u-u(z) + f3E[u(p)] + 13 F(p)d[u(p)] offer price and mean-preserving spread results in
o an increase in the reservation price. ~E[u(p) ]) and h"(r) = F'(r) > 0, which implies that h(r) is a convex function. Thus, holding all other parameters in equation (7) constant and increasing the mean of the offer price, Ep, will shift the curve (Ep Because farm income plays an important role in reservation price ,,mean of the offer price, Ep, will shift the curve (E increase, we assume that the farm income of farmers and speculators is + h(r)) upward for all r. The intersection of the the same in order to simplify the analysis. This assumptin does not curves, (r -z)/3 and (Ep + h(r)), will result in dramatically change the result because some farmers may themselves be higher r This graphical sketch f equspeculation (7) ors. Moreover, in the case of property tax relief policies, certain higher r. This grapnical sKetcn of equation (7) minimum income standards have to be met to qualify for the program, proves Proposition 1. This proposition suggests which could be used as the benchmark for farm income.
u-l( fr Fp p) PROOF: Using the implicit relationship derived
from equation (8) (i.e., drldz > 0) and equation (11), we have
Since r > z, we have, u(z) > u'(r), u'(z) = u'(r), and u'(z) < u'(r) for risk-averse, risk-neutral, and -z + 3Ep + 3 f r F(p)dp = r risk-loving owners, respectively.~~~J o ~We have already shown that policies that inwhe an ' ae r n p s u r rk crease farm income also increase the reservation where r a and r" are reservation prices under risk-price. Proposition 3 suggests that the increase in averse and risk-neutral assumptions, respectively.
i. ii Thes risk-loving case can be proven in a similar the reservation price is greater if land owners are The risk-loving case can be proven in a similar -i manner.nrisk-loving.
If we assume that other agents are manner.
Even without imposing additional structure, the risk-loving or less risk-averse than farmers, then Even without imposing additional structure, the Proposition 3 suggests that at the urban fringes, model provides important insights about the ability Proposition 3 suggests that at the urban fringes J.P~~~~~ , ^ J -. 0 iwhen Propositions 2 and 3 are considered, farmof risk preferences to influence land-use decisions.
en rpstions 2 nd e nsideed farm land preservation policies designed to help farmers Recall that the reservation price is a major factor in ld n ic determining whether land is converted to other keep land in agriculture may be disproportionately determining whether land is converted to other i r i i helping speculators. Further, under the riskuses. Increases in the reservation price help to de-h . , u t lay the sale of far d.
6
i t a f neutrality assumption from which equation (9) was lay the sale of farmland. Hence in the absence of . . lan t esaeoran c a crucial implication developed, although it is true that as the reservafarmland preservation policy, a crucial implication .farmland preservation policy, acrucial implition tion price increases, land remains in agriculture of Proposition 2 is that at the same level of risk, i a r iya risk-aversJe farmer exits farming longer, under the assumption that farmers are more land held by a risk-averse farmer exits farming Jsethnland held by a risk-nesf reutsa farmer be i nrisk-averse than other agents, and by implication faster than land held by a risk-neutral farmer befaster than land held by a risk-neutral farmer be-have lower reservation prices, land in agricultural cause of the lower reservation price. Put another p e f a a production exits farming at a faster rate with presway, the degree of risk aversion is important in ervation policies and without reservation policies. determining the extent to which land is preserved ence it s a whe risk preerenes a J .i? Hence, it appears that when risk preferences are and capitalized, because of the impact of risk prefi f i considered, farmland preservation policy, such as erences on the reservation price. Therefore if we use-value assessment that increases current farm assume that real estate speculators are less riskassume thatc real este income, while effectively protecting the interest of averse than farmers, then Proposition 2 suggests ino , le effectivey pr ing the interest that because the reservation price of farmers is other agents, is less effective in serving the needs that because the reservation price of farmers is o i of farming and farm-held open space. lower than that of speculators, more land will increasingly be held by speculators, a condition observed by Brown and Brown. Earlier we showed that increases in farm income Summary and Conclusion increase the reservation price, a capitalization effect, and that increases in the reservation price de-We used a search-theoretic approach to extend the lay the sale of land, a preservation effect. Suppose literature on farmland preservation by incorporatthat the increase in farm income is the result of ing risk preference into the analysis through its government farmland preservation policy. Propo-impact o the reservation price of land owners We sition 3 posits the impact of such a policy on res-developed a framework to show how risk preferervation prices when risk preferences are consid-ence influences land-use decisions in the absence ered.
and presence of government farmland preservation PROPOSITION 3: Whenfaced with the same gov-policy. We further analyzed the impact of risk neuernment policy, which increases current farm in-trality, risk aversion, and risk-loving preferences come, the reservation price increases less (more) if on the preservation price of farmers. Implications the farmner is risk-averse (loving) than if he is risk-for farmland preservation policy were explored. neutral.
The analysis suggests that when risk preferences are considered, a government policy that increases farm income favors landowners who are less risk- 
